Formalizing Foundations of Mathematics

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Abstract

Over the recent decades there has been a trend towards formalized mathematics, and a number of sophisticated systems have been developed to support the formalization process and mechanically verify its result. However, each tool is based on a specific foundation of mathematics, and formalizations in different systems are not necessarily compatible. Therefore, the integration of these foundations has received growing interest. We contribute to this goal by using LF as a foundational framework in which the mathematical foundations themselves can be formalized and therefore also the relations between them. We represent three of the most important foundations – Isabelle/HOL, Mizar, and ZFC set theory – as well as relations between them. The relations are formalized in such a way that the framework permits the extraction of translation functions, which are guaranteed to be well-defined and sound. Our work provides the starting point of a systematic study of formalized foundations in order to compare, relate, and integrate them.

1 Introduction

The 20th century saw significant advances in the field of foundations of mathematics stimulated by the discovery of paradoxes in naive set theory, e.g., Russell's paradox of unlimited set comprehension. Several seminal works have redeveloped and advanced large parts of mathematics based on one coherent choice of foundation, most notably the Principia (Whitehead & Russell 1913) and the works by Bourbaki (Bourbaki 1964). Today various flavors of axiomatic set theory and type theory provide a number of well-understood foundations.

Given a development of mathematics in one fixed foundation, it is possible to give a fully formal language in which every mathematical expression valid in that foundation can be written down. Then mathematics can – in principle – be reduced to the manipulation of these expression, an approach called *formalism* and most prominently expressed in Hilbert's program. Recently this approach has gained more and more momentum due to the advent of computer technology: With machine support, the formidable effort of formalizing mathematics becomes feasible, and the trust in the soundness of an argument can be reduced to the trust in the implementation of the foundation.

However, compared to "traditional" mathematics, this approach has the drawback that it heavily relies on the choice of one specific foundation. Traditional mathematics, on

the other hand, frequently and often crucially abstracts from and moves freely between foundations to the extent that many mathematical papers do not mention the exact foundation used. This level of abstraction is very difficult to capture if every statement is rigorously reduced to a fixed foundation. Moreover, in formalized mathematics, different systems implementing different (or even the same or similar) foundations are often incompatible, and no reuse across systems is possible.

But the high cost of formalizing mathematics makes it desirable to join forces and integrate foundational systems. Currently, due to the lack of integration, significant overlap and redundancies exist between libraries of formalized mathematics, which slows down the progress of large projects such as the formal proofs of the Kepler conjecture (Hales 2003).

Our contribution can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we introduce a new methodology for the formal integration of foundations: Using a logical framework, we formalize not only mathematical theories but also the foundations themselves. This permits formally stating and proving relations between foundations. Secondly, we demonstrate our approach by formalizing three of the most widely-used important foundations as well as translations between them. Our work provides the starting point of a formal library of foundational systems that complements the existing foundation-specific libraries and provides the basis for the systematic and formally verified integration of systems for formalized mathematics.

We begin by describing our approach and reviewing related work in Sect. 2. Then, in Sect. 3, we give an overview of the logical framework we use in the remainder of the paper. We give a new formalization of traditional mathematics based on ZFC set theory in Sect. 4. Then we formalize two foundations with particularly large formalized libraries: Isabelle/HOL (Nipkow, Paulson & Wenzel 2002) in Sect. 5 and Mizar (Trybulec & Blair 1985) in Sect. 6. We also give a translation from Isabelle/HOL into ZFC and sketch a partial translation from Mizar (which is stronger than ZFC) to ZFC. We discuss our work and conclude in Sect. 7.

Our formalizations span several thousand lines of declarations, and their descriptions are correspondingly simplified. The full sources are available at (Iancu & Rabe 2010).

2 Problem Statement and Related Work

Automath (de Bruijn 1970) and the formalization of Landau's analysis (Landau 1930, van Benthem Jutting 1977) were the first major success of formalized mathematics. Since then a number of computer systems have been put forward and have been adopted to varying degrees to formalize mathematics such as LCF (Gordon, Milner & Wadsworth 1979), HOL (Gordon 1988), HOL Light (Harrison 1996), Isabelle/HOL (Nipkow et al. 2002), IMPS (Farmer, Guttman & Thayer 1993), Nuprl (Constable, Allen, Bromley, Cleaveland, Cremer, Harper, Howe, Knoblock, Mendler, Panangaden, Sasaki & Smith 1986), Coq (Coquand & Huet 1988), Mizar (Trybulec & Blair 1985), Isabelle/ZF (Paulson & Coen 1993), and the body of peer-reviewed formalized mathematics is growing (T. Hales and G. Gonthier and J. Harrison and F. Wiedijk 2008, Matuszewski 1990, Klein,

Nipkow & (eds.) 2004). A comparison of some formalizations of foundations in Automath, including ZFC and Isabelle/HOL, is given in (Wiedijk 2006).

The problem of interoperability and integration between these systems has received growing attention recently, and a number of connections between them have been established. (Obua & Skalberg 2006) and (McLaughlin 2006) translate between Isabelle/HOL and HOL Light; (Keller & Werner 2010) from HOL Light to Coq; and (Krauss & Schropp 2010) from Isabelle/HOL to Isabelle/ZF. The OpenTheory format (Hurd 2009) was designed as an interchange format for different implementations of higher order logic.

We call these translations *dynamically verified* because they have in common that they translate theorems in such a way that the target system reproves every translated theorem. One can think of the source system's proof as an oracle for the target system's proof search. This approach requires no reasoning about or trust in the translation so that users of the target system can reuse translated theorems without making the source system or the translation part of their trusted code base. Therefore, such translations can be implemented and put to use relatively quickly. It is no surprise that such translations are advanced by researchers working with the respective target system.

Still, dynamically verified translations can be unsatisfactory. The proofs of the source theorems may not be available because they only exist transiently when the source system processes a proof script. The source system might not be able to export the proofs, or they may be too large to translate. In that case, it is desirable to translate only the theorems and appeal to a general result that guarantees the soundness of the theorem translation.

However, the statement of soundness naturally lives outside either of the two involved foundations. Therefore, stating, let alone proving, the soundness of a translation requires a third formal system in which source and target system and the translation are represented. We call the third system a *foundational framework*, and if the soundness of a translation is proved in a foundational framework, we speak of a *statically verified* translation.

Statically verified translations are theoretically more appealing because the soundness is proved once and for all. Of course, this requires the additional assumptions that the foundational framework is consistent and that the representations in the framework are adequate. If this is a concern, the soundness proof should be *constructive*, i.e., produce for every proof in the source system a translated proof in the target system. Then users of the target system have the option to recheck the translated proof.

The most comprehensive example of a statically verified translation – from HOL to Nuprl (Naumov, Stehr & Meseguer 2001) – was given in (Schürmann & Stehr 2004). HOL and Nuprl proof terms are represented as terms in the framework Twelf (Harper, Honsell & Plotkin 1993, Pfenning & Schürmann 1999) using the judgments-as-types methodology. The translation and a constructive soundness proof are formalized as type-preserving logic programs in Twelf. The soundness is verified by the Twelf type checker, and the well-definedness – i.e., the totality and termination of the involved logic programs – is proved using Twelf.

In this work, we demonstrate a general methodology for statically verified translations. We formalize foundations as signatures in the logical framework Twelf, and we use the

LF module system's (Rabe & Schürmann 2009) translations-as-morphisms methodology to formalize translations between them as signature morphisms. This yields translations that are well-defined and sound by design and which are verified by the Twelf type checker. Moreover, they are constructive, and the extraction of translation programs is straightforward.

Our work can be seen as a continuation of the Logosphere project (Pfenning, Schürmann, Kohlhase, Shankar & Owre. 2003), of which the above HOL-Nuprl translation was a part. Both Logosphere and our work use LF, and the main difference is that we use the new LF module system to reuse encodings and to encode translations. Logosphere had to use monolithic encodings and used programs to encode translations. The latter were either Twelf logic program or Delphin (Poswolsky & Schürmann 2008) functional programs, and their well-definedness and termination was statically verified by Twelf and Delphin, respectively. Using the module system, translations can be stated in a more concise and declarative way, and the well-definedness of translations is guaranteed by the LF type theory.

There are some alternative frameworks in which foundations can be formalized: other variants of dependent type theory such as Agda (Norell 2005), type theories such as Coq based on the calculus of inductive constructions, or the Isabelle framework (Paulson 1994) based on polymorphic higher-order logic. All of these provide roughly comparably expressive module systems. We choose LF because the judgments-as-types and relations-as-morphisms methodologies are especially appropriate to formalize foundations and their relations.

We discuss related work pertaining to the individual foundations separately below.

3 The Edinburgh Logical Framework

The Edinburgh Logical Framework (Harper et al. 1993) (LF) is a formal meta-language used for the formalization of deductive systems. It is related to Martin-Löf type theory and the corner of the lambda cube that extends simple type theory with dependent function types and kinds. We will work with the Twelf (Pfenning & Schürmann 1999) implementation of LF and its module system (Rabe & Schürmann 2009).

The central notion of the LF type theory is that of a *signature*, which is a list Σ of *kinded type family* symbols $a : K$ or *typed constant* symbols $c : A$. It is convenient to permit those to carry optional definitions, e.g., $c : A = t$ to define c as t. (For our purposes, it is sufficient to assume that these abbreviations are transparent to the underlying type theory, which avoids some technical complications. Of course, they are implemented more intelligently.)

LF *contexts* are lists Γ of typed variables $x : A$, i.e., there is no polymorphism. Relative to a signature Σ and a context Γ, the expressions of the LF type theory are *kinds* K, *kinded type families* $A : K$, and *typed terms* $t : A$. `type` is a special kind, and type families of kind `type` are called *types*.

We will use the concrete syntax of Twelf to represent expressions:

- The dependent function type $\Pi_{x:A}B(x)$ is written $\{x : A\}\, B\ x$, and correspondingly for dependent function kinds $\{x : A\}\, K\ x$. As usual we write $A \to B$ when x does not occur free in B.
- The corresponding λ-abstraction $\lambda_{x:A}t(x)$ is written $[x : A]\, t\ x$, and correspondingly for type families $[x : A]\, (B\ x)$.
- As usual, application is written as juxtaposition.

Given two signatures $\mathtt{sig}\ S\ =\ \{\Sigma\}$ and $\mathtt{sig}\ T\ =\ \{\Sigma'\}$, a *signature morphism* σ from S to T is a list of assignments $c := t$ and $a := A$. They are called *views* in Twelf and declared as $\mathtt{view}\ v\ : S\ \to T\ = \{\sigma\}$. Such a view is well-formed if

- σ contains exactly one assignment for every symbol c or a that is declared in Σ without a definition,
- each assignment $c := t$ assigns to the Σ-symbol $c : A$ a Σ'-term t of type $\overline{\sigma}(A)$,
- each assignment $a := K$ assigns to the Σ-symbol $a : K$ a Σ'-type family K of type $\overline{\sigma}(K)$.

Here $\overline{\sigma}$ is the homomorphic extension of σ that maps all closed expressions over Σ to closed expressions over Σ', and we will write it simply as σ in the sequel. The central result about signature morphisms (see (Harper, Sannella & Tarlecki 1994)) is that they preserve typing and $\alpha\beta\eta$-equality: Judgments $\vdash_\Sigma t : A$ imply judgments $\vdash_{\Sigma'} \sigma(t) : \sigma(A)$ and similarly for kinding judgments and equality.

Finally, the Twelf module system permits inclusions between signatures and views. If a signature T contains the declaration $\mathtt{include}\ S$, then all symbols declared in (or included into) S are available in T via qualified names, e.g., c of S is available as $S.c$. Our inclusions will never introduce name clashes, and we will write c instead of $S.c$ for simplicity. Correspondingly, if S is included into T, and we have a view v from S to T', a view from T to T' may include v via the declaration $\mathtt{include}\ v$.

This yields the following grammar for Twelf where gray color denotes optional parts.

Toplevel	G	$::=$	$\cdot \mid G,\ \mathtt{sig}\ T\ =\ \{\Sigma\} \mid G,\ \mathtt{view}\ v\ : S\ \to T\ = \{\sigma\}$
Signatures	Σ	$::=$	$\cdot \mid \Sigma,\ \mathtt{include}\ S \mid \Sigma,\ c : A = t \mid \Sigma,\ a : K = t$
Morphisms	σ	$::=$	$\cdot \mid \Sigma,\ \mathtt{include}\ v \mid \sigma,\ c := t \mid \sigma,\ a := A$
Kinds	K	$::=$	$\mathtt{type} \mid \{x : A\}\, K$
Type families	A	$::=$	$a \mid A\ t \mid [x : A]\, A \mid \{x : A\}\, A$
Terms	t	$::=$	$c \mid t\ t \mid [x : A]\, t \mid x$

We will sometimes omit the type of a bound variable if it can be inferred from the context. Moreover, we will frequently use implicit arguments: If c is declared as $c : \{x : A\}\, B$ and the value of s in $c\ s$ can be inferred from the context, then c may alternatively be declared as $c : B$ (with a free variable in B that is implicitly bound) and used as c (where the argument to c inferred). We will also use fixity and precedence declarations in the style of Twelf to make applications more readable.

Example 1 (Representation of FOL in LF). The following is a fragment of an LF signature for first-order logic that we will use later to formalize set theory:

$$
\begin{array}{llll}
\texttt{sig}\ FOL = \{ & & & \\
\quad set & : & \texttt{type} & \\
\quad prop & : & \texttt{type} & \\
\quad ded & : & prop \to \texttt{type} & \texttt{prefix}\ 0 \\
& & & \\
\quad \Rightarrow & : & prop \to prop \to prop & \texttt{infix}\ 3 \\
\quad \wedge & : & prop \to prop \to prop & \texttt{infix}\ 2 \\
\quad \forall & : & (set \to prop) \to prop & \\
\quad \doteq & : & set \to set \to prop & \texttt{infix}\ 4 \\
\quad \Leftrightarrow & : & prop \to prop \to prop & \texttt{infix}\ 1 \\
 & = & [a]\,[b]\,(a \ \Rightarrow\ b) \ \wedge\ (b \ \Rightarrow\ a) & \\
\quad \wedge_I & : & ded\ A \to ded\ B \to ded\ A \ \wedge\ B & \\
\quad \wedge_{E_l} & : & ded\ A \ \wedge\ B \to ded\ A & \\
\quad \wedge_{E_r} & : & ded\ A \ \wedge\ B \to ded\ B & \\
\quad \Rightarrow_I & : & (ded\ A \to ded\ B) \to ded\ A \ \Rightarrow\ B & \\
\quad \Rightarrow_E & : & ded\ A \ \Rightarrow\ B \to ded\ A \to ded\ B & \\
\quad \forall_I & : & (\{x : i\}\ ded\ (F\ x)) \to ded\ (\forall\ [x]\ \ F\ x) & \\
\quad \forall_E & : & ded\ (\forall\ [x]\ \ F\ x) \to \{c : i\}\ ded\ (F\ c) & \\
\} & & &
\end{array}
$$

This introduces two types *set* and *prop* for sets and propositions, respectively, and a type family *ded* indexed by propositions. Terms p of type $ded\ F$ represents proofs of F, and the inhabitation of $ded\ F$ represents the provability of F. Higher-order abstract syntax is used to represent binders, e.g., $\forall([x : set]\,F\ x)$ represents the formula $\forall x : set.F(x)$. Equivalence is introduced as a defined connective.

Note that the argument of *ded* does not need brackets as *ded* has the weakest precedence. Moreover, by convention, the Twelf binders [] and {} always bind as far to the right as is consistent with the placement of brackets.

As examples for inference rules, we give natural deduction introduction and elimination rules conjunction and implication. Here A and B of type *prop* are implicit arguments whose types and values are inferred. For example, the theorem of commutativity of conjunction can now be stated as

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
comm_conj & : & ded\,(A \ \wedge\ B) \ \Leftrightarrow\ (B \ \wedge\ A) \\
 & = & \wedge_I\ (\Rightarrow_I\ \ [p]\,\wedge_I\ (\wedge_{E_r}\ p)\ (\wedge_{E_l}\ p)) \\
 & & \quad (\Rightarrow_I\ \ [p]\,\wedge_I\ (\wedge_{E_r}\ p)\ (\wedge_{E_l}\ p))
\end{array}
$$

The LF type system guarantees that the proof is correct.

4 Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory

In this section, we present out formalization of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. We give an overview over our variant of ZFC in Sect. 4.1 and describe its encoding in Sect. 4.2

and 4.3. Finally, we discuss related formalizations in Sect. 4.4.

4.1 Preliminaries

Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (Zermelo 1908, Fraenkel 1922) (with or without choice) is the most common implicitly or explicitly assumed foundation of mathematics. It represents all mathematical objects as sets related by the binary $\in$ predicate. Propositions are stated using an untyped first-order logic. The logic is classical, but we will take care to reason intuitionistically whenever possible.

There are a number of equivalent choices for the axioms of ZFC. Our axioms are

- Extensionality: $\forall x \forall y (\forall z (z \in x \Leftrightarrow z \in y) \Rightarrow x = y)$
- Set existence: $\exists x\ true$ (This could be derived from the axiom of infinity, but we add it explicitly here to reduce dependence on infinity.),
- Unordered pairing: $\forall x \forall y \exists a (\forall z (z = x \vee z = y) \Rightarrow z \in a)$
- Union: $\forall X \exists a \forall z (\exists x (x \in X \wedge z \in X) \Rightarrow z \in a)$
- Power set: $\forall x \exists a \forall z ((\forall t (t \in z \Rightarrow t \in x)) \Rightarrow z \in a)$
- Specification: $\forall X \exists a (\forall z ((z \in X \wedge \varphi(z)) \Leftrightarrow z \in a))$ for a unary predicate φ (possibly containing free variables)
- Replacement: $\forall a (\forall x (x \in a) \Rightarrow \exists^! y (\varphi\ x\ y)) \Rightarrow \exists b (\forall y (\exists x (x \in a \wedge \varphi(x, y)) \Leftrightarrow y \in b))$ for a binary predicate φ (possibly containing free variables) where $\exists^!$ abbreviates the easily definably quantifier of unique existence
- Regularity: $\forall x (\exists t (t \in x)) \Rightarrow (\exists y (y \in x \wedge \neg (\exists z (z \in x \wedge z \in y))))$.
- Choice and infinity, which we omit here.

It is important to note that there are no first-order terms except for the variables. Specific sets (i.e., first-order constant symbols) and operations on sets (i.e., first-order function symbols) are introduced only as derived notions: A new symbol may be introduced to abbreviate a uniquely determined set. For example, the empty set $\varnothing$ abbreviates the unique set x satisfying $\forall y. \neg y \in x$. Adding such abbreviations is conservative over first-order logic but cannot be formalized within the language of first-order.

4.2 Untyped Set Theory

Our Twelf formalization of ZFC uses three main signatures: *ZFC_FOL* encodes first-order logic, *ZFC* encodes the first-order theory of ZFC, and finally *Operations* introduces the basic operations and their properties, most notably products and functions. The actual encodings (Iancu & Rabe 2010) comprise several hundred lines of Twelf declarations and are factored into a number of smaller signatures to enhance maintainability

and reuse. Therefore, our presentation here is only a summary. Moreover, to enhance readability, we will use more Unicode characters in identifiers here than in the actual encodings.

First-Order Logic ZFC_FOL is an extension of the signature FOL given in Ex. 1. Besides the usual components of FOL encodings in LF (see e.g., (Harper et al. 1993)), we use two special features.

Firstly, we add the (definite) *description operator* $\delta : \{F : set \to prop\}\, ded\ \exists^! ([x]\, F\ x) \to set$, which encodes the mathematical practice of giving a name to a uniquely determined object. Here $\exists^!$ is the quantifier of unique existence which is easily definable. Thus δ takes a formula $F(x)$ with a free variable x and a proof of $\exists^! x.F(x)$ and returns a new set. The LF type system guarantees that δ can only be applied after showing unique existence. δ is axiomatized using the axiom scheme $ax_\delta : ded\ F\ (\delta\ F\ P)$; from this we can derive irrelevance, i.e., $\delta\ F\ P$ returns the same object no matter which proof P is used.

Secondly, we add *sequential connectives* for conjunction and implication. In a sequential implication $F \Rightarrow' G$, G is only considered if F is true, and similarly for conjunction. This is very natural in mathematical practice – for example, mathematicians do not hesitate to write $x \neq 0 \Rightarrow' x/x = 1$ when / is only defined for non-zero dividers. All other connectives remain as usual.

Sequential implication and conjunction are formalized in LF as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{lcl}
\wedge' & : & \{F : prop\}\,(ded\ F \to prop) \to prop \\
\Rightarrow' & : & \{F : prop\}\,(ded\ F \to prop) \to prop \\
\wedge'_I & : & \{p : ded\ F\}\ ded\ G\ p\ \to\ F \wedge' [p]\, G\ p \\
\wedge'_{E_l} & : & ded\ F \wedge' [p]\, G\ p\ \to\ ded\ F \\
\wedge'_{E_r} & : & \{q : ded\ F \wedge' [p]\, G\ p\}\ ded\ G\ (\wedge' E_l\ q) \\
\Rightarrow'_I & : & (\{p : ded\ F\}\ ded\ G\ p)\ \to\ ded\ F \Rightarrow' [p]\, G\ p \\
\Rightarrow'_E & : & ded\ F \Rightarrow' [p]\, G\ p\ \to\ \{p : ded\ F\}\ ded\ G\ p
\end{array}
$$

$\wedge'$ and $\Rightarrow'$ are applied to two arguments, first a formula F, and then a formula G stated in a context in which F is true. This is written as, e.g., $F \wedge' [p]\, G\ p$ where p is an assumed proof of F that may occur in G. We will use $F \wedge' G$ and $F \Rightarrow' G$ as abbreviations when p does not occur in G, which yield the non-sequential cases. The introduction and elimination rules are generalized accordingly. Note that these sequential connectives do not rely on classicality.

In plain first-order logic, such sequential connectives would be useless as a proof cannot occur in a formula. But in the presence of the description operator, the proofs frequently occur in terms and thus in formulas.

Set Theory The elementhood predicate is encoded as $\in: set \to set \to prop$ together with a corresponding infix declaration. The formalization of the axioms is straightforward, for example, the axiom of extensionality is encoded as:

$$ax_exten \quad : \quad ded\, \forall\, [x]\ \forall\, [y]\, (\forall\, [z]\ z\ \in\ x\ \Leftrightarrow\ z\ \in\ y) \Rightarrow\ x\ \doteq\ y$$

It is now easy to establish the adequacy of our encoding in the following sense: Every well-formed closed LF-term $s : set$ over ZFC encodes a unique set satisfying a certain predicate F. This is obvious because s must be of the form $\delta\ F\ P$. The inverse does not hold as there are models of set theory with more sets than can be denoted by closed terms.

Basic Operations We can now derive the basic notions of set theory and their properties: Using the description operator and the respective axioms, we can introduce defined Twelf symbols

$$\begin{array}{lll} empty & : & set = \dots \\ uopair & : & set \to set = \dots \\ bigunion & : & set \to set = \dots \\ powerset & : & set \to set = \dots \\ image & : & (set \to set) \to set \to set = \dots \\ filter & : & set \to (set \to prop) \to set = \dots \end{array}$$

such that $empty$ encodes $\varnothing$, $uopair\ x\ y$ encodes $\{x, y\}$, $bigunion\ X$ encodes $\bigcup X$, $powerset\ X$ encodes $\mathcal{P}X$, $image\ f\ A$ encodes $\{f(x) : x \in A\}$, and $filter\ A\ F$ encodes $\{x \in A \mid F(x)\}$.

For example, to define $uopair$ we proceed as follows:

$$\begin{array}{lll} is_uopair & : & set \to set \to set \to prop \\ & = & [x]\,[y]\,[a]\,(\forall\,[z]\ (z\ \doteq\ x\ \vee\ z\ \doteq\ y)\ \Leftrightarrow\ z\ \in\ a) \\ p_uopair & : & ded\ \exists^!\ (is_uopair\ A\ B) \\ & = & spec_unique\ (shrink\ (\forall_E\ (\forall_E\ ax_pairing\ A)\ B)) \\ uopair & : & set \to set \to set = [x]\,[y]\ \ \delta\ (is_uopair\ x\ y)\ p_uopair \end{array}$$

Here $is_uopair\ x\ y\ a$ formalizes the defining property $a\ \doteq\ \{x, y\}$ of the new function symbol, and p_uopair shows unique existence. The above uses two lemmas

$$\begin{array}{lll} shrink & : & ded\ (\exists\,[X]\ \forall\,([z]\ (\varphi\, z)\ \Rightarrow\ z\ \in\ X)) \\ & \to & ded\ (\exists\,[x]\ \forall\,([z]\ (\varphi\, z)\ \Leftrightarrow\ z\ \in\ x)) = \cdots \\ spec_unique & : & ded\ (\exists\,[x]\ \forall\,([z]\ (\varphi\, z)\ \Leftrightarrow\ z\ \in\ x)) \\ & \to & ded\ \exists^!\ [x]\ \forall\,([z]\ (\varphi\, z)\ \Leftrightarrow\ z\ \in\ x) = \cdots \end{array}$$

$shrink$ expresses that if there is a set X that contains all the elements for which the predicate $\varphi : set \to prop$ holds, then the set described by φ exists. $spec_unique$ expresses that if a predicate $\varphi : set \to prop$ describes a set then that set exists uniquely. They can be proved easily using extensionality and specification.

Advanced Operations Then we can define the advanced operations on sets in the usual way. For example, the definition of binary union $x \cup y = \bigcup\{x, y\}$ can be directly formalized as

$$union \quad : \quad set \rightarrow set \rightarrow set = [x]\,[y]\;\; bigunion\; (uopair\; x\; y)$$

We omit the definitions of singleton sets, ordered pairs, cartesian products, relations, partial functions, and functions. Our definitions are standard except for the ordered pair. We define $(x, y) = \{\{x\}, \{\{y\}, \emptyset\}\}$, which is similar to Wiener's definition (Wiener 1967) and different from the more common $(x, y) = \{\{x, y\}, \{x\}\}$ due to Kuratowski. Our definition is a bit simpler to work with than Kuratowski pairs because it avoids the special case $(x, x) = \{\{x\}\}$.

$$\begin{array}{lcl} pair & : & set \rightarrow set \rightarrow set \\ & = & [a]\,[b]\;\; uopair\; (singleton\; a)\; (uopair\; (singleton\; b)\; empty) \end{array}$$

The difference with Kuratowski pairs is not significant as we immediately prove the characteristic properties of pairing and then never appeal to the definition anymore.

$$\begin{array}{lcl} conv_{pi1} & : & ded\; pi1\; (pair\; X\; Y) \;\doteq\; X \;= \cdots \\ conv_{pi2} & : & ded\; pi2\; (pair\; X\; Y) \;\doteq\; X \;= \cdots \\ conv_{pair} & : & ded\; ispair\; X \rightarrow ded\; pair\; (pi1\; X)\; (pi2\; X) \;\doteq\; X \;= \cdots \end{array}$$

The proofs are technical but straightforward.

Finally, we can define function construction $X \ni x \mapsto f(x)$ and application $f(x)$ as

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \lambda & : & set \rightarrow (set \rightarrow set) \rightarrow set = [a]\,[f]\;\; image\; ([x]\;\; pair\; x\; (f\; x))\; a \\ @ & : & set \rightarrow set \rightarrow set \\ & = & [f]\,[a]\;\; bigunion\; (image\; pi2\; (filter\; f\; ([x]\; (pi1\; x) \doteq a))) \end{array}$$

where $\lambda\; A\; f$ encodes $\{(x, f(x)) : x \in A\}$, and $@\; f\; x$ yields "the b such that $(a, b) \in f$". Application is defined for all sets: for example, it returns $\varnothing$ if f is not defined for x.

Like for pairs, we immediately prove the characteristic properties, which are known as $\beta\eta$-conversion and extensionality in computer science. We never use other properties than these later on:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} conv_{apply} & : & ded\; X \;\in\; A \rightarrow ded\; @\; (\lambda\; A\; F)\; X \;\doteq\; F\; X \;= \cdots \\ conv_{lambda} & : & ded\; F \;\in\; (\Rightarrow A\, B) \rightarrow ded\; \lambda\; A\; ([x]\;\; @\; F\; x) \;\doteq\; F \;= \cdots \\ func_{ext} & : & ded\; F \;\in\; (\Rightarrow A\, B) \rightarrow ded\; G \;\in\; (\Rightarrow A\, B) \;\rightarrow \\ & & (\{a\}\; ded\; a \in A \rightarrow ded\; @F\; a \doteq @G\; a) \rightarrow ded\; F \doteq G = \cdots \end{array}$$

Again we omit the straightforward proofs.

4.3 Typed Set Theory

Classes as Types A major drawback of formalizations of set theory is the complexity of reasoning about elementhood and set equality. It is well-known how to overcome these using typed languages, but in mathematical accounts of set theory, types are not primitive but derived notions. We proceed accordingly: The central idea is to use the predicate subtype $Elem\; A = \{x : set \mid ded\; x \in A \;\; \text{inhabited}\;\}$ to represent the set A. In fact, we can use the same approach to recover classes as a derived notion: $Class\; F = \{x : set \mid ded\; F\; x \;\; \text{inhabited}\;\}$ for any unary predicate $F : set \rightarrow prop$.

However, LF does not support predicate subtypes (for the good reason that it would make the typing relation undecidable). Therefore, we think of elements x of the class $\{x \mid F(x)\}$ as pairs (x, P) where $P : ded\ F\ x$ is a proof that x is indeed in that class. We encode this in LF as follows:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} Class & : & (set \to prop) \to \mathtt{type} \\ celem & : & \{a : set\}\ ded\ F\ a \to Class\ F \\ cwhich & : & Class\ F \to set \\ cwhy & : & \{a : Class\ F\}\ ded\ (F\ (cwhich\ a)) \\ & & \\ Elem & : & set \to type = [a]\ Class\ [x]\ x\ \in\ a \\ elem & : & \{a : set\}\ ded\ a\ \in\ A \to elem\ A = [a]\,[p]\ celem\ a\ p \\ which & : & elem\ A \to set = [a]\ cwhich\ a \\ why & : & \{a : elem\ A\}\ ded\ (which\ a)\ \in\ A = [a]\ cwhy\ a \end{array}$$

Class F encodes $\{x|F(x)\}$, *celem* x P produces an element of a class, and *cwhich* x and *cwhy* x return the set and its proof. The remaining declarations specialize these notions to the classes $\{x|x \in A\}$.

To axiomatize these, we use the additional axiom $eqwhich : ded\ cwhich\ (elem\ X\ P)\ \doteq\ X$ as well as the following axiom for proof irrelevance

$$proofirrel\quad :\quad \{f : ded\ G \to Class\ A\}\ ded\ cwhich\ (f\ P)\ \doteq\ cwhich\ (f\ Q)$$

which formalizes that two sets are equal if they only differ in a proof.

Typed Operations Using the types *Elem* A, we can now lift all the basic untyped operations introduced above to the typed level. In particular, we define typed quantifiers $\forall^*$, $\exists^*$, typed equality $\doteq^*$, typed function spaces $\Rightarrow^*$, and booleans *bool* as follows.

Firstly, we define *typed quantifiers* such as $\forall^* : (elem\ A \to prop) \to prop$. In higher-order logic (Church 1940), such typed quantification can be defined easily using abstraction over the booleans. This is not possible in ZFC because the type *prop* is not a set itself, i.e., we have $prop : \mathtt{type}$ and not $prop : set$. If we committed to classical logic, we could use the set $bool : set$ from below.

A natural solution is relativization as in $\forall^*\ F := \forall[x]\,x \in A \Rightarrow'\ F\ x$ for $F : elem\ A \to prop$. However, an attempt to define typed quantification like this meets a subtle difficulty: In $\forall^*\ F$, F only needs to be defined for elements of A whereas in $\forall[x]\,x \in A \Rightarrow'\ F\ x$, F must be defined for all sets even though $F\ x$ is intended to be ignored if $x \notin A$. Therefore, we use sequential connectives:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \forall^* & : & (Elem\ A \to prop) \to prop\ =\ [F]\ \big(\forall[x]\,x \in A \Rightarrow'\ [p]\,(F\ (elem\ x\ p))\big) \\ \exists^* & : & (Elem\ A \to prop) \to prop\ =\ [F]\ \big(\exists[x]\,x \in A \wedge'\ [p]\,(F\ (elem\ x\ p))\big) \end{array}$$

It is easy to derive the expected introduction and elimination rules for $\forall^*$ and $\exists^*$.

Secondly, *typed equality* is easy to define:

$$\doteq^*\quad :\quad Elem\ A \to Elem\ A \to prop\ =\ [a]\,[b]\,(which\ a) \doteq (which\ b)$$

It is easy to see that all rules for $\doteq$ can be lifted to $\doteq^*$.

Then, thirdly, we can define *function types* in the expected way:

$$
\begin{array}{lcl}
\Rightarrow^* & : & set \rightarrow set \rightarrow set = [x]\,[y]\;\; Elem\;(x \Rightarrow y) \\
\lambda^* & : & (Elem\;A \rightarrow Elem\;B) \rightarrow Elem\;(A \Rightarrow^* B)\;\; = \ldots \\
@^* & : & Elem\;(A \Rightarrow^* B) \rightarrow Elem\;A \rightarrow Elem\;B \\
 & = & [F]\,[x]\;\; elem\;(@\;(which\;F)\;(which\;x))\;(funcE\;(why\;F)\;(why\;x)) \\
beta & : & ded\;\;(@^*\;(\lambda^*\;[x]\,F\;x)\;A) \doteq^*\; F\;A\;\; = \ldots \\
eta & : & ded\;\;(\lambda^*\;[x]\,(@^*\;F\;x)) \doteq^*\; F\;\; = \ldots
\end{array}
$$

We omit the quite involved definitions and only mention that the typed quantifiers and thus the sequential connectives are needed in the definitions.

Finally, we introduce the set $\{\varnothing, \{\varnothing\}\}$ of booleans and derive some important operations for them. In particular, these are the constants 0 and 1, a supremum operation on families of booleans, a variant of if-then-else where the then-branch (else-branch) may depend on the truth (falsity) of the condition, and a reflection function mapping propositions to booleans.

$$
\begin{array}{lcl}
bool & : & set = uopair\;empty\;(singleton\;empty) \\
0 & : & Elem\;bool = \ldots \\
1 & : & Elem\;bool = \ldots \\
sup & : & (Elem\;A \rightarrow Elem\;bool) \rightarrow Elem\;bool \\
ifte & : & \{F : prop\}\,(ded\;F \rightarrow Elem\;A) \rightarrow (ded\;\neg\;F \rightarrow Elem\;A) \\
 & & \rightarrow Elem\;A = \ldots \\
reflect & : & Elem\;prop \rightarrow Elem\;bool
\end{array}
$$

The definition of the supremum operation is only possible after proving that $\{\varnothing, \{\varnothing\}\} = \mathcal{P}\{\varnothing\}$, which requires the use of excluded middle. (In fact, it is equivalent to it.) Similarly, $reflect$ and $ifte$ can only be defined in the presence of excluded middle. All other definitions in our formalization of ZFC are also valid intuitionistically.

4.4 Related Work

Several formalizations of set theory have been proposed and developed quite far. Most notable are the encodings of Tarski-Grothendieck set theory in Mizar (Trybulec & Blair 1985, Trybulec 1989) and of ZF in Isabelle (Paulson 1994, Paulson & Coen 1993). The most striking difference with our formalization is that these employ sophisticated machine support with structured proof languages. Since there is no comparable machine support for Twelf, our encoding uses hand-written proof terms.

We chose LF because it permits a more elegant formalization: We use only $\in$ as a primitive symbol and use a description operator to introduce names for derived concepts. This deviates from standard accounts of formalized mathematics and is in contrast to Mizar where primitive function symbols are used for singleton, unordered pair, and union, and to Isabelle/ZF where primitive function symbols are used for empty set, power set, union, infinite set, and replacement. But it corresponds more closely to mathematical practice, where the implicit use of a description operator is prevalent.

Our encoding depends crucially on dependent types. Description operators are also used in typed formalizations of mathematics such as HOL (Church 1940). They differ from ours by not taking a proof of unique existence as an argument. Consequently, they must assume the non-emptiness of all types and a global choice function. Other language features only possible in a dependently-typed framework are sequential connectives and our $ifte$ construct. Connectives similar to our sequential ones are also used in PVS (Owre, Rushby & Shankar 1992) and in (de Nivelle 2010), albeit without proof terms occurring explicitly in formulas.

Moreover, using dependent types, we can recover typed reasoning as a derived notion. Here, our approach is similar to the one in Scunak (Brown 2006), and in fact our formalization of classes and typed reasoning is inspired by the one used in Scunak. Scunak uses a variant of dependent type theory specifically developed for this purpose: The symbols set, $prop$, and $Class$, and the axioms $eqwhich$ and $proofirrel$ are primitives of the type theory. This renders the formalization much simpler at the price of using a less elegant framework.

A compromise between our encoding and Scunak's would be an extension of the LF framework. For example, the dependent sum type $\Sigma_{x:set}(ded\ F\ x)$ could be used instead of our $Class\ F$. Moreover, in (Lovas & Pfenning 2009) a variant of proof irrelevance is introduced for LF that might make our encoding more elegant.

5 Isabelle and Higher-Order Logic

5.1 Preliminaries

Isabelle Isabelle is a logical framework and generic LCF-style interactive theorem prover based on polymorphic higher-order logic (Paulson 1994). We will only consider the core language of Isabelle here – the *Pure* logic and basic declarations – and omit the module system and the structured proof language. We gave a comprehensive formalization of *Pure* and the Isabelle module system in (Rabe 2010).

The grammar for Isabelle is given in Fig. 1, which is a simplified variant of the one given in (Wenzel 2009).

con	::=	$c :: \tau$
ax	::=	$a : \varphi$
lem	::=	$l : \varphi\ proof$
typedecl	::=	$(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)t$
types	::=	$(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)t = \tau$
τ	::=	$\alpha \mid (\tau, \ldots, \tau)\ t \mid \tau \Rightarrow \tau \mid prop$
term	::=	$x \mid c \mid term\ term \mid \lambda x :: \tau.term$
φ	::=	$\varphi \Longrightarrow \varphi \mid \bigwedge x :: \tau.\varphi \mid term \equiv term$
proof	::=	$\ldots$

Figure 1: Isabelle Grammar

An Isabelle theory is a list of declarations of typed constants $c :: \tau$, axioms $a : \varphi$, lemmas $a : \varphi\ P$ where P proves φ, and n-ary type operators $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)t$ which may carry a definition in terms of the α_i. Definitions for constants can be introduced as special cases of axioms, and we consider base types as nullary type operators.

Types τ are formed from type variables α, type operator applications $(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)t$, function types, and the base type *prop* of propositions. Terms are formed from variables, constants, application, and lambda abstraction. Propositions are formed from implication $\Longrightarrow$, universal quantification $\bigwedge$ at any type, and equality on any type. (Wenzel 2009) does not give a grammar for proofs but lists the inference rules; they are $\bigwedge$ introduction and elimination, $\Longrightarrow$ introduction and elimination, reflexivity and substitution for equality, β and η conversion, and functional extensionality.

Constants may be polymorphic in the sense that their types may contain free type variables. When a polymorphic constant is used, Isabelle automatically infers the type arguments.

HOL The most advanced logic formalized in Isabelle is HOL (Nipkow et al. 2002). Isabelle/HOL is a classical higher-order logic with shallow polymorphism, non-empty types, and choice operator (Church 1940, Gordon & Pitts 1993).

Isabelle/HOL uses the same types and function space as Isabelle. But it introduces a type *bool* for HOL-propositions (i.e., booleans since HOL is classical) that is different from the type *prop* of Isabelle-propositions. The coercion $Trueprop : bool \Rightarrow prop$ is used as the Isabelle truth judgment on HOL propositions. HOL declares primitive constants for implication, equality on all types, definite and indefinite description operator $some\ x : \tau.P$ and $the\ x : \tau.P$ for a predicate $P : \tau \Rightarrow bool$. Furthermore, HOL declares a polymorphic constant $undefined$ of any type and an infinite base type ind, which we omit in the following. Based on these primitives and their axioms, simply-typed set theory is developed by purely definitional means.

Going beyond the Isabelle framework, Isabelle/HOL also supports Gordon/HOL-style type definitions using representing sets. A set A on the type τ is given by its characteristic function, i.e., $A : \tau \Rightarrow bool$. An Isabelle/HOL type definition is of the form $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\ t = A\ P$ where P and A contain the variables $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ and P proves that A is non-empty. If such a definition is in effect, t is an additional type that is axiomatized to be isomorphic to the set A.

5.2 Formalizing Isabelle/HOL

Isabelle Our formalization of Isabelle follows the one we gave in (Rabe 2010). We declare an LF signature $Pure$ for the inner syntax of Isabelle, which declares symbols for all primitives that can occur in expressions. $Pure$ is given in Fig. 2.

This yields a straightforward structural encoding function $\ulcorner - \urcorner$ that acts as described in Fig. 3. Similar encodings are well-known for LF, see e.g., (Harper et al. 1993). The only subtlety is the case of polymorphic constant applications $c\ t_1\ \ldots\ t_n$ where the type of c contains type variables $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$. Here we need to infer the

```
sig S = {
  include Pure
  ⌜Σ⌝
}
```

$$
\begin{array}{lcll}
\texttt{sig}\ Pure = \{ & & & \\
\quad tp & : & \texttt{type} & \\
\quad \Rightarrow & : & tp \to tp \to tp & \texttt{infix}\ 0 \\
\quad tm & : & tp \to \texttt{type} & \texttt{prefix}\ 0 \\
\quad \lambda & : & (tm\ A \to tm\ B) \to tm\ (A \Rightarrow B) & \\
\quad @ & : & tm\ (A \Rightarrow B) \to tm\ A \to tm\ B & \texttt{infix}\ 1000 \\
 & & & \\
\quad prop & : & tp & \\
\quad \bigwedge & : & (tm\ A \to tm\ prop) \to tm\ prop & \\
\quad \Longrightarrow & : & tm\ prop \to tm\ prop \to tm\ prop & \texttt{infix}\ 1 \\
\quad \equiv & : & tm\ A \to tm\ A \to tm\ prop & \texttt{infix}\ 2 \\
 & & & \\
\quad \vdash & : & tm\ prop \to \texttt{type} & \texttt{prefix}\ 0 \\
\quad \bigwedge I & : & (x : tm\ A \vdash (B\ x)) \ \to \vdash \bigwedge([x]\, B\ x) & \\
\quad \bigwedge E & : & \vdash \bigwedge([x]\, B\ x) \ \to\ \{x : tm\ A\} \vdash (B\ x) & \\
\quad \Longrightarrow I & : & (\vdash A \ \to \vdash B) \ \to \vdash A \Longrightarrow B & \\
\quad \Longrightarrow E & : & \vdash A \Longrightarrow B \ \to \vdash A \ \to \vdash B & \\
\quad refl & : & \vdash X \equiv X & \\
\quad subs & : & \{F : tm\ A \ \to\ tm\ B\} \vdash X \equiv Y \ \to \vdash F\ X \equiv F\ Y & \\
\quad exten & : & (\{x : tm\ A\} \vdash (F\ x) \equiv (G\ x)) \ \to \vdash \lambda F \equiv \lambda G & \\
\quad beta & : & \vdash (\lambda[x : tm\ A]\, F\ x)\ @\ X \equiv F\ X & \\
\quad eta & : & \vdash \lambda\ ([x : tm\ A]\, F\ @\ x) \equiv F & \\
\} & & &
\end{array}
$$

Figure 2: LF Signature for Isabelle

types $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m$ at which c is applied, and put $\ulcorner c\ t_1\ \ldots\ t_n \urcorner = (c\ \ulcorner \tau_1 \urcorner\ \ldots\ \ulcorner \tau_m \urcorner)\, @ \ulcorner t_1 \urcorner\ \ldots\ @ \ulcorner t_n \urcorner$. Polymorphic axioms and lemmas occurring in proofs are treated accordingly. Finally, an Isabelle theory $S = \Sigma$ is represented as shown on the right where $\ulcorner \Sigma \urcorner$ is defined declaration-wise according to Fig. 4.

Adequacy It is easy to show the adequacy of this encoding: For an Isabelle theory Σ, Isabelle types τ over Σ with type variables from $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$ are in bijection with LF-terms $\ulcorner \tau \urcorner : tp$ in context $\alpha_1 : tp, \ldots, \alpha_m : tp$, and accordingly Isabelle terms $t :: \tau$ with LF-terms $\ulcorner t \urcorner : tm\ \ulcorner \tau \urcorner$, and Isabelle proofs P of φ with LF-terms $\ulcorner P \urcorner : \vdash\ \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner$.

$$
\begin{array}{lcl}
\texttt{sig}\ HOL = \{ & & \\
\quad \texttt{include}\ Pure & & \\
\quad bool & : & tp \\
\quad trueprop & : & tm\ bool \Rightarrow prop \\
\quad eps & : & tm\ (A \Rightarrow bool) \Rightarrow A \\
\quad \doteq & : & tm\ A \Rightarrow A \Rightarrow bool \\
\quad set & : & tp \to tp = [a]\, a \Rightarrow bool \\
\quad nonempty & : & (tm\ set\ A) \to \texttt{type} = \ldots \\
\quad typedef & : & \{s : tm\ set\ A\}\ nonempty\ s \to tp \\
\quad Rep & : & tm\ (typedef\ S\ P) \Rightarrow A \\
\quad Abs & : & tm\ A \Rightarrow (typedef\ (S\ :\ tm\ set\ A)\ P) \\
\} & &
\end{array}
$$

Figure 5: LF Signature for HOL

Expression	Isabelle	LF
type term proof	τ $t :: \tau$ P proving φ	$\ulcorner t \urcorner : tp$ $\ulcorner t \urcorner : tm \ulcorner \tau \urcorner$ $\ulcorner P \urcorner : \vdash \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner$
	containing type variables $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$	in context $\alpha_1 : tp, \ldots, \alpha_m : tp$

Figure 3: Encoding of Expressions

Declaration	Isabelle	LF
type operator	$(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\ t$	$t : tp \to \ldots \to tp \to tp$
type definition	$(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\ t = \tau$	$t : tp \to \ldots \to tp \to tp$ $= [\alpha_1] \ldots [\alpha_n]\, \tau$
constant	$c :: \tau, \quad \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$ in τ	$c : tp \to \ldots \to tp \to tm \ulcorner \tau \urcorner$
axiom	$a : \varphi, \quad \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$ in τ	$a : tp \to \ldots \to tp \to \vdash \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner$
lemma	$l : \varphi\ P, \quad \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$ in φ, P	$l : tp \to \ldots \to tp \to \vdash \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner$ $= [\alpha_1] \ldots [\alpha_m]\ \ulcorner P \urcorner$

Figure 4: Encoding of Declarations

HOL Since HOL is an Isabelle theory, its LF-encoding follows immediately from the definition above. The fragment arising from translating some of the primitive declarations of HOL is given in the upper part of the signature HOL in Fig. 5. For example, eps is the choice operator. The lower part gives some of the additional declarations needed to encode HOL-style type definitions. The central declaration is $typedef$, which takes a set S on the type A and a proof that S is nonempty and returns a new type, say T. Rep and Abs translate between A and T, we refer to (Wenzel 2009) for details.

5.3 Interpreting Isabelle/HOL in ZFC

We formalize the relation between Isabelle/HOL and ZFC by giving two views $PureZFC$ and $HOLZFC$ from $Pure$ and HOL, respectively, to ZFC^+ as shown on the right. These formalize the standard set-theoretical semantics of higher-order logic.



ZFC^+ arises from ZFC by adding a global choice function $choice : \{A : Class\ nonempty\}\,(Elem\ (chwich\ A))$ that produces an element of a non-empty set A. This is stronger than the axiom of choice (which merely states the existence of such an element) but needed to interpret the choice operators of HOL.

Isabelle The general structure of the translation is given in Fig. 6 and the view in Fig. 7. Types are mapped to non-empty sets, terms to elements, in particular propositions to booleans, and proofs of φ to proofs of $PureZFC(\varphi) \doteq^* 1$. These invariants are encoded (and guaranteed) by the assignments to *tp*, *tm*, *prop*, and $\vdash$ in $PureZFC$. It is tempting to map Isabelle propositions to ZFC propositions rather than to booleans. However, in Isabelle, *prop* is a normal type and thus must be interpreted as a set. An alternative would be to map *prop* to a set representing intuitionistic truth values rather than classical ones, but we omit that for simplicity. (Due to our use of a standard model, we cannot expect completeness anyway.)

Isabelle/HOL	ZFC
$\tau : tp$	$PureZFC(\tau) : Class\ nonempty.$
$t : tm\ \tau$	$PureZFC(t) : Elem\ (cwhich\ PureZFC(\tau)).$
$\varphi : tm\ prop$	$PureZFC(\varphi) : Elem\ (cwhich\ boolne).$
$P : \vdash\ \varphi$	$PureZFC(P) : ded\ PureZFC(\varphi) \doteq^* (bbne\ 1).$

Figure 6: Isabelle/HOL Declarations in ZFC

The case for terms t is a bit tricky: Since τ is interpreted as an element of *Class nonempty*, we first have to apply *cwhich* to obtain a set. Then we apply *Elem* to this set to obtain the type of its elements. Similarly, *prop* cannot be mapped directly to *Elem bool*. Instead, we have to introduce $boolne : Class\ nonempty$ which couples *bool* with the proof that it is a non-empty set. Therefore, we also have to define the auxiliary functions $bbne : Elem\ bool \to Elem\ (cwhich\ boolne)$ and $bneb : Elem\ (cwhich\ boolne) \to Elem\ bool$ to convert back and forth. These technicalities indicate a drawback of our – otherwise perfectly natural – representation of classes. Different representations that separate the mapping of types to sets from the proofs of non-emptiness may prove more scalable, but would require a more sophisticated framework.

```
view PureZFC : Pure → ZFC = {
    tp    :=  Class nonempty
    tm    :=  elem
    prop  :=  boolne
    ⊢     :=  [x] ded x ≐* 1
    ⇒     :=  ⇒*
    λ     :=  λ*
    @     :=  @*
    ⋀     :=  ∀*
    ⟹     :=  ⇒
    ≡     :=  ≐*
  ⋮
}
```

Figure 7: Interpreting Pure in ZFC

The remaining cases are straightforward. For example, $\Rightarrow$ must be mapped to a ZFC expression that takes two arguments of type *Class nonempty* and returns another, i.e., must respect the invariants above.

HOL Similarly, we obtain a view from HOL to ZFC, a fragment of which is shown in Fig. 8. HOL booleans are mapped to ZFC booleans so that *trueprop* is mapped to the identity. The choice operator *eps* is interpreted using $ifte$ and *choice*. Note that

in the given Twelf terms we elide some bookkeeping proof steps. The then-branch uses $elem\ (filter\ f)\ P$ to construct an element of $Class\ nonempty$, to which then $choice$ is applied. In both cases, P must use the assumption p that the condition of the $ifte$-split is true.

$typedef\ s\ p$ is interpreted using $filter$ according to s. Thus, type definitions using sets on A are interpreted as subsets of A in the expected way. The proof p is used to obtain an element of $Class\ nonempty$.

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\texttt{view}\ HOLZFC : HOL \to ZFC = \{} \\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\quad \texttt{include}\ PureZFC} \\
\quad bool & := & bool \\
\quad trueprop & := & [x]\,x \\
\quad \doteq & := & \lambda^*([x](\lambda^*([y]bbne(reflect(x \doteq^* y))))) \\
\quad eps & := & [f : Elem\ (A \Rightarrow^* bool)]\, ifte\ (nonempty\ (filter\ f)) \\
 & & \quad ([p]\ (choice\ (elem\ (filter\ f)\ p))) \\
 & & \quad ([p]\ choice\ A) \\
\quad \vdots & & \\
\quad typedef & := & [s : Elem\ (A \Rightarrow bool)]\,[p]\, celem\ (filter\ ([x]\, s\,@\,x \doteq^* 1))\ p \\
\quad \vdots & & \\
\}
\end{array}
$$

Figure 8: Interpreting HOL in ZFC

5.4 Related Work

Our formalization of Isabelle is a special case of the one we gave in (Rabe 2010). There we also cover the Isabelle module system. Together with the formalization of HOL given here, we now cover interpretations of Isabelle locales in terms of Isabelle/HOL. This is interesting because if Isabelle locales are seen as logical theories and HOL as a foundation of mathematics, then interpretations can be seen as models.

Formalizations of HOL in logical frameworks have been given in (Pfenning et al. 2003) using LF and of course in Isabelle itself (Nipkow et al. 2002). Ours appears to be the first formalization of Isabelle and HOL and the meta-relation between them. Moreover, we do not know any other formalizations of HOL-style type definitions in a formal framework – even in the Isabelle/HOL formalization, the type definitions are not expressed exclusively in terms of the Pure meta-language.

Our semantics of Isabelle/HOL does not quite follow the one given in (Gordon & Pitts 1993). There, individual models provide a set $\mathcal{U}$ of sets, and every type is interpreted as an element of $\mathcal{U}$. Models must provide further structure to interpret HOL type constructors, in particular a choice function on $\mathcal{U}$. Our semantics can be seen as a single model where the set theoretical universe is used instead of $\mathcal{U}$. Consequently, our model is not a set itself and thus not a model in the sense of (Gordon & Pitts 1993), but every individual model in that sense is subsumed by ours.

Independent of our work, a similar semantics of Isabelle/HOL is given in (Krauss & Schropp 2010). They translate Isabelle/HOL to Isabelle/ZF where the interpretation of Pure is simply the identity. Their semantics is given as a target-trusting implementation rather than formalized in a framework. They also use the full set-theoretical universe and a global choice function. An important difference is the treatment of non-emptiness: They assume that interpretations for all type constructors are given that respect non-emptiness; then they can interpret all types as sets (which will always be non-empty) and only have to relativize universal quantifiers over types to quantifiers over non-empty sets. Our translation is more complicated in that respect because it uses *Class nonempty* to guarantee the non-emptiness.

6 Mizar and Tarski-Grothendieck Set Theory

6.1 Preliminaries

Mizar At its core, Mizar (Trybulec & Blair 1985) is an implementation of classical first-order logic. However, it is designed to be used with a single theory: set theory following the Tarski-Grothendieck axiomatization (Tarski 1938, Bourbaki 1964) (TG). Consequently, Mizar is strongly influenced by its representation of TG. Like Isabelle, it includes a semi-automated theorem prover and a structured proof language.

Mizar/TG is notable for being the only major system for the formalization of mathematics that is based on set theory. Types are only introduced as a means of efficiency and clarity but not as a foundational commitment. Moreover, the Mizar Mathematical Library is one of the largest libraries of formalized mathematics containing over 50000 theorems and 9500 definitions.

Mizar's logic is an extension of classical first-order logic with second-order axiom schemes. The proof system is Jaskowski-style natural deduction (Jaśkowski 1934). Contrary to the LCF style implementations of HOL and to our ZFC, which try to use a small set of primitives, Mizar features a rich ontology of primitive mathematical objects, types, and proof principles.

In particular, the type *set* of terms (i.e., sets in Mizar/TG) can be refined using a complex type system, see, e.g., (Wiedijk 2007). The basic types are called *modes*, and while they are semantically predicate subsorts (i.e., classes in Mizar/TG), they are technically primitive in Mizar. Modes can be further refined by *attributes*, which are predicates on a type. These two refinement relations generate a subtype relation between type expressions, called type *expansion*. Both modes and attributes may take arguments, which makes Mizar dependently-typed. Mizar enforces the non-emptiness of all types, and all mode definitions and attribute applications induce the respective proof obligations.

The notion of typed first-order functions between types, called *functors*, is primitive. Function definitions may be implicit, in which case they induce proof obligations for well-definedness.

This expressivity makes theorems and proofs written in Mizar relatively easy to read

but makes it hard to represent Mizar itself in a logical framework. We will use the grammar given in Fig. 9, which is a substantially simplified variant of the one given in (Mizar 2009). Here ... and * denote possibly empty repetition.

Article	::=	*Article-Name** *Text-Proper*
Text-Proper	::=	$(Block \mid Theorem)^*$
Block	::=	`definition let` $(x$ `be` $\vartheta)^*$ *Definition* `end`
Definition	::=	*Mode* $\mid$ *Functor* $\mid$ *Attribute*
Mode	::=	`mode` M `of` $x_1, \dots, x_n$ `is` ϑ
	$\mid$	`mode` M `of` $x_1, \dots, x_n \rightarrow \vartheta$ `means` α `existence` *proof*
Attribute	::=	`attr` x `is` $(x_1, \dots, x_n)V$ `means` α
Functor	::=	`func` $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ `equals` t
	$\mid$	`func` $f(x_1, \dots, x_n) \rightarrow \vartheta$ `means` α `existence` *proof* `uniqueness` *proof*
Theorem	::=	`theorem` T : α *proof*
t	::=	$x \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$
α	::=	t `is` $\vartheta \mid t$ `in` $t \mid \alpha \& \alpha \mid$ `not` $\alpha \mid t = t$
	$\mid$	`for` x `be` ϑ `holds` α
ϑ	::=	*Adjective** *Radix*
Adjective	::=	$(t_1, \dots, t_n)V \mid$ `non` $(t_1, \dots, t_n)V$
Radix	::=	M `of` $t_1, \dots, t_n$
proof	::=	...

Figure 9: Mizar Grammar

A Mizar article starts with one import clause for every kind of declaration to import from other articles. Instead, we only permit cumulative imports of whole articles. This is followed by a list of definitions and theorems. We only permit mode, functor, and attribute definitions. Predicate definitions and schemes could be added easily.

All three kinds of definitions introduce a new symbol, which takes a list of typed term arguments x_i. The type ϑ_i of x_i must be given by a `let` declaration or defaults to the type *set*. Mode definitions define M `of` $x_1, \dots, x_n$ either explicitly as the type $\vartheta(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ or implicitly as the type of sets *it* of type ϑ satisfying $\alpha(it, x_1, \dots, x_n)$. In the latter case, non-emptiness must be proved. Similarly, functor definitions define $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ either explicitly as $t(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ or implicitly as the object *it* of type ϑ satisfying $\alpha(it, x_1, \dots, x_n)$. In the latter case, well-definedness, i.e., existence and uniqueness, must be proved. Finally, attribute definitions define $(x_1, \dots, x_n)V$ as the unary predicate on the type of x given by $\alpha(x, x_1, \dots, x_n)$.

Terms t and formulas α are formed in the usual way, and we omit the productions for *proof* terms. `in` and `is` are used for elementhood in a set or a type, respectively. Finally, types are formed by providing a list of possibly negated adjectives on a mode. In Mizar, these types must be proved to be non-empty before they can be used, which we will omit here.

Tarski-Grothendieck Set Theory TG is similar to ZFC but uses Tarski's axiom asserting that for every set there is a universe containing it. It implies the axioms of infinity, choice, power set, and large cardinals. Mizar/TG is defined in the Mizar article `Tarski` (Trybulec 1989), which contains primitives for elementhood, singleton, unordered pair, union, the Fraenkel scheme, the Tarski axiom, as well as a definition of ordered pairs following Kuratowski.

6.2 Formalizing Mizar and TG Set Theory

$$
\begin{array}{lcll}
\multicolumn{4}{l}{\texttt{sig}\ Mizar\ =\ \{} \\
\quad tp & : & \texttt{type} & \\
\quad prop & : & \texttt{type} & \\
\quad proof & : & prop \to \texttt{type} & \texttt{prefix}\ 0 \\
\quad be & : & tp \to \texttt{type} & \\
\quad set & : & tp & \\
\quad is & : & be\ T \to tp \to prop & \texttt{infix}\ 30 \\
\quad in & : & be\ T \to be\ T' \to prop & \texttt{infix}\ 30 \\
\quad not & : & prop \to prop & \texttt{prefix}\ 20 \\
\quad and & : & prop \to prop \to prop & \texttt{infix}\ 10 \\
\quad eq & : & be\ T \to be\ T' \to prop & \texttt{infix}\ 10 \\
\quad \vdots & & & \\
\quad for & : & (be\ T \to prop) \to prop & \\
\quad \vdots & & & \\
\quad func & : & \{f : be\ T \to prop\}(proof\ ex\ [x]\ \ f\ x) \to & \\
 & & proof\ for\ [x]\ for\ [y]\ (f\ x\ and\ f\ y)\ implies\ x\ eq\ y \to be\ T & \\
\quad func_{prop} & : & \{F\}\,\{Ex\}\,\{Unq\}\ \ proof\ F\ (func\ F\ Ex\ Unq) & \\
\quad attr & : & tp \to \texttt{type} = [t]\ \ (be\ t \to prop) & \\
\quad adjective & : & \{t : tp\}\ \ attr\ t \to tp & \\
\quad adjI & : & \{x : be\ X\}\,(proof\ A\ x) \to be\ (adjective\ X\ A) & \\
\quad adjE & : & \{x : be\ (adjective\ X\ A)\}\ \ be\ X & \\
\quad adjE' & : & \{x : be\ (adjective\ X\ A)\}\,proof\ A\ (adjE\ x) & \\
\quad \vdots & & & \\
\} & & &
\end{array}
$$

Figure 10: LF Signature for Mizar

Mizar The LF signature that encodes Mizar's logic is given in Fig. 10, where we omit the declarations of definable constants, such as equivalence *iff* and existential quantifier *ex*. The general form of the encoding of Mizar expressions in LF is given in Fig. 11. Mizar types, formulas, and proofs of F are represented as LF terms of the types *tp*, *prop*, and $proof\ \ulcorner F \urcorner$, respectively. The judgment *expand* encodes Mizar's type expansion relation.

Mizar's use of a type system within an untyped foundation is hard to represent in a logical framework. We mimic it by using an auxiliary type constructor *be* with the intended meaning that $t : be\ T$ encodes a Mizar term t of type T. Consequently, if T

expands to T', terms of type T must be explicitly cast to obtain terms of type T' by applying *cast*.

Attributes on a type ϑ are represented as LF terms of type *attr* ϑ. In effect, they are represented as LF functions $be\ \vartheta \to prop$. A type $\vartheta = A_1 \ \ldots\ A_m\ R$ is encoded as *adjective* $(\ldots(adjective\ R\ A_m)\ \ldots\ )\ A_1$. Attributes $A = (t_1,\ldots,t_n)V$ are encoded as $V \ulcorner t_1 \urcorner \ \ldots\ \ulcorner t_n \urcorner$. Finally types M `of` $t_1,\ldots,t_n$ (radix types in Mizar) are encoded as $M \ulcorner t_1 \urcorner \ldots \ulcorner t_n \urcorner$.

To that, we add LF constant declarations that represent the primitive formula and proof constructors of Mizar's first-order logic. For formulas and proofs, this is straightforward, and the only subtlety is to identify exactly which constructors are primitive. For example, *or* and *imp* are defined using *and* and *not*. We omit the constructors for type expansion. This induces an encoding of Mizar terms, types, formulas, and proofs as LF terms. The only remaining subtlety is that applications of *cast* must be inserted whenever the well-formedness of a type depends on the type expansion relations.

Expression	Mizar	LF
type	ϑ	$\ulcorner\vartheta\urcorner : tp$
formula	α	$\ulcorner\alpha\urcorner : prop$
proof	P proving α	$\ulcorner P\urcorner : proof\ \ulcorner\alpha\urcorner$
typed term	$t\ be\ \vartheta$	$\ulcorner t\urcorner : be\ \ulcorner\vartheta\urcorner$
type expansion	ϑ expands to ϑ'	$expand\ \ulcorner\vartheta\urcorner\ \ulcorner\vartheta'\urcorner$ inhabited

Figure 11: Encoding of Expressions

Then we can represent Mizar declarations according to Fig. 12. Explicit functor and mode definitions are represented easily as defined LF constants. Implicit definitions are represented using special constants *func* and *mode*. $func\ ([x : be\ \vartheta]\,\alpha\ x)\ ex\ unq$ encodes the uniquely existing object of type ϑ that satisfies α. Similar to δ in our ZFC encodings, it takes proofs of existence and uniqueness as arguments. $mode\ ([x : be\ \vartheta]\,\alpha\ x)\ P$ encodes the necessarily non-empty subtype of ϑ containing the objects satisfying α. Attribute definitions are encoded easily. In all three cases, the arguments $x_1,\ldots,x_n$ of Mizar functors/modes/attributes are represented directly as LF arguments. Finally, theorems are encoded in the same way as for Isabelle.

Finally, we can encode a Mizar article $Art_1,\ldots,Art_n\ TP$ in file A as the following LF signature where the *Text-Proper* part TP is encoded declaration-wise.

```
sig A = {
  include Mizar
  include Art_1
  ⋮
  include Art_n
  ⌜TP⌝
}
```

Adequacy Intuitively, our Mizar encoding should be adequate in the sense that Mizar articles that stay within our simplified grammar are well-formed in Mizar iff their encoding is well-formed in LF.

We cannot state or even prove the adequacy because there is no reference semantics of Mizar that would be rigorous and complete

Mizar	LF
`let` x_i `be` ϑ_i	
`mode` M `of` $x_1,\dots,x_n$ `is` ϑ	$M : \{x_1 : be \ulcorner\vartheta_1\urcorner\} \dots \{x_n : be \ulcorner\vartheta_n\urcorner\}\, tp$ $= [x_1] \dots [x_n] \ulcorner\vartheta\urcorner$
`mode` M `of` $x_1,\dots,x_n \to \vartheta$ `means` α `existence` P	$M : \{x_1 : be \ulcorner\vartheta_1\urcorner\} \dots \{x_n : be \ulcorner\vartheta_n\urcorner\}\, tp$ $= [x_1] \dots [x_n]\, mode\, ([it] \ulcorner\alpha\urcorner) \ulcorner P\urcorner$
`func` $f(x_1,\dots,x_n)$ `equals` t t expands to ϑ	$f : \{x_1 : be \ulcorner\vartheta_1\urcorner\} \dots \{x_n : be \ulcorner\vartheta_n\urcorner\}\, be \ulcorner\vartheta\urcorner$ $= [x_1] \dots [x_n] \ulcorner t\urcorner$
`func` $f(x_1,\dots,x_n) \to \vartheta$ `means` α `existence` P `uniqueness` Q	$f : \{x_1 : be \ulcorner\vartheta_1\urcorner\} \dots \{x_n : be \ulcorner\vartheta_n\urcorner\}\, be \ulcorner\vartheta\urcorner$ $= [x_1] \dots [x_n]\, func\, ([it] \ulcorner\alpha\urcorner) \ulcorner P\urcorner \ulcorner Q\urcorner$
`let` x `be` ϑ `attr` x `is` $(x_1,\dots,x_n)V$ `means` α	$V : \{x_1 : be \ulcorner\vartheta_1\urcorner\} \dots \{x_n : be \ulcorner\vartheta_n\urcorner\}\, attr \ulcorner\vartheta\urcorner$ $= [x_1] \dots [x_n]\, ([x] \ulcorner\alpha\urcorner)$
`theorem` $T : \alpha\ P$	$T : proof \ulcorner\alpha\urcorner = \ulcorner P\urcorner$

Figure 12: Encoding of Declarations

enough for that. This is partially due to the fact that Mizar is justified more through mathematical intuition than through a formal semantics.

TG Set Theory The encoding of TG set theory given in Fig. 13 is rather straightforward. The use of LF's {} binder for Mizar's axiom schemes is the only subtlety. The definitions for *singleton*, *uopair*, and *union* are given using *func*, and their existence and uniqueness conditions are stated as axioms. We only give the case for *singleton*. The Tarski axiom is easy to encode but requires some auxiliary definitions.

6.3 Interpreting Mizar/Tarski in ZFC

Similar to the interpretation of Isabelle/HOL in ZFC, we give corresponding views for Mizar. Here the view from $Tarski$ to ZFC is dashed because it is partial: It omits the Tarski axiom, which goes beyond ZFC.



Mizar The general idea of the interpretation of Mizar in ZFC is given in Fig. 14. In particular, a type ϑ is interpreted as a unary predicate (the intensional description of ϑ), and the auxiliary type *be* ϑ as the class of sets in ϑ (the extensional description of ϑ). Technically, we should interpret types as non-empty predicates, i.e., as pairs of a predicate and an existence proof. We avoid that because it would complicate the encoding even more than in the case of Isabelle/HOL. This is possible because no part of our restricted Mizar language relies on the non-emptiness of type.

Type expansion is interpreted as a subclass relationship, and the interpretation of *cast* maps a set to itself but treated as an element of a different class. This is formalized by the first declarations in the view $MizarZFC$ in Fig. 15.

```
sig Tarski = {
  include Mizar
  ⋮
  singleton_ex     : {y : be set} proof ex [it : be set] (for [x : be set]
                     (x in it) iff (x eq y))
  singleton_unq    : {y} proof for [it] for [it'] (for [x] (x in it iff x eq y)
                     and for [x] (x in it' iff x eq y)) implies it eq it'
  singleton        : be set → be set = [y] func ([it] for [x] x in it iff x eq y)
                     (singleton_ex y) (singleton_unq y)
  ⋮
  fraenkel         : {A : be set} {P : be set → be set → prop}
                     proof (for [x : be set] for [y : be set] for [z : be set]
                     ((P x y) and (P x z)) implies y eq z) → proof (ex [X]
                     for [x] ((x in X) iff (ex [y] y in A and (P y x))))
  ⋮
  subset_closed    : {m} prop = [m] for [x] (for [y]
                     ((( x in m) and (y ⊆ x)) implies (y in m)))
  powerset_closed  : {m} prop = [m] for [x] (x in m implies (ex [z] z in m
                     and (for [y] y ⊆ x implies y in z)))
  tarski_ax        : proof for [n] (ex [m] (
                     n in m and subset_closed m and
                     powerset_closed m and for [x]
                     (x ⊆ m implies ((isomorphic x m) or x in m))))
  ⋮
}
```

Figure 13: Encoding TG Set Theory

func is interpreted using the description operator from ZFC, and the interpretation of *mode* is trivial.

Finally, attributed modes *adjective* ϑ A are interpreted using the conjunction of the interpretations $P : set \to prop$ of ϑ and $Q : Class\ P \to prop$ of A. Note how sequential conjunction is needed to use the truth of $P\ x$ in the second conjunct. This is necessary because in Mizar A only has to be defined for terms of type ϑ, which corresponds to Q only being applicable to sets satisfying P.

We omit the straightforward but technical remaining cases for formula and proof constructors.

TG The view *TarskiZFC* from *Tarski* to *ZFC* is straightforward, and we omit the details. However, the view is only partial because it omits the Tarski axiom.

Partial views in LF simply omit cases. Consequently, their homomorphic extensions are partial functions. For our view, that means that every definition or theorem that

Mizar	ZFC
$\vartheta : tp$	$MizarZFC(\vartheta) : set \to prop$
$\alpha : prop$	$MizarZFC(\alpha) : prop$
$P : proof\ \alpha$	$MizarZFC(P) : ded\ MizarZFC(P)$
$\alpha : be\ \vartheta$	$MizarZFC(\alpha) : Class\ MizarZFC(\vartheta)$

Figure 14: Mizar/TG Declarations in ZFC

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\texttt{view}\ MizarZFC : Mizar \to ZFC = \{ & & \\
\quad tp & := & set \to prop \\
\quad prop & := & prop \\
\quad proof & := & ded \\
\quad be & := & [f]\ Class\ f \\
\quad set & := & [x]\ \top \\
\quad is & := & [a]\,[F]\,F\ (cwhich\ a) \\
\quad in & := & [a]\,[b]\,(cwhich\ a)\ \in\ (cwhich\ b) \\
\quad \vdots & & \\
\quad func & := & [F]\,[EX]\,[UNQ]\,\delta\ F\ (andI\ EX\ UNQ) \\
\quad mode & := & [F : Class\ A \to prop]\,[EX]\,([x]\,(A\ x)\ \wedge'\ [p]\,F\ (celem\ x\ p)) \\
\quad adjective & := & [P : set \to prop]\,[Q : Class\ T \to prop] \\
 & & \quad [x]\,(P\ x) \wedge' [p]\,(Q\ (celem\ x\ p)) \\
\quad \vdots & & \\
\} & &
\end{array}
$$

Figure 15: Interpreting $Mizar$ in ZFC

depends on the Tarski axiom cannot be translated to ZFC. This is more harmful than it sounds: Since the Tarski axiom is used in Mizar to prove the existence of power set, infinity, and choice, almost all definitions depend on it.

However, we have already designed an elegant extension of the notion of Twelf views that solves this problem in (Dumbrava & Rabe 2010). With this extension, it is possible to make $TarskiZFC$ undefined for the Tarski axiom, but map Mizar's theorems of power set, infinity, and choice, which depend on the Tarski axiom, to their counterparts in ZFC. We say that power set, infinity, and choice are *recovered* by the view. Then Mizar expressions that are stated in terms of the recovered constants can still be translated to ZFC, and the preservation of truth is still guaranteed. With this amendment, most theorems in the Mizar library can be translated. Only theorems that directly appeal to the Tarski axiom remain untranslatable, and that is intentional because they are likely to be unprovable over ZFC.

6.4 Related Work

Mizar is infamous for being impenetrable as a logic, and previous work has focused on making the syntax and semantics of Mizar more accessible. The main source of complexity is the type system.

(Wiedijk 2007) gives a comprehensive account on the syntax and semantics of the Mizar type system. It interprets types as predicates in the same way as we did here. A translation to first-order logic is given that is similar in spirit to our translation to ZFC. An alternative approach using type algebras was given in (Bancerek 2003).

In (Urban 2003), a translation of Mizar into TPTP-based first-order logic is given. It also interprets types as predicates.

7 Conclusion and Future Work

We have represented three foundations of mathematics and two translations between them in a formal framework, namely Twelf. The most important feature is that the well-definedness and soundness of the translations are verified statically and automatically by the Twelf type checker. In particular, the LF type system guarantees that the translation functions preserve provability. Our work is the first systematic case study of statically verified translations between foundations.

Our foundations are ZFC, Mizar's Tarski-Grothendieck set theory (TG) and Isabelle's higher-order logic (HOL). We chose ZFC as the most widespread foundation of non-formalized mathematics, and our formalization stays notably close to textbook developments of ZFC. (We have to add a global choice function though both for Isabelle/HOL and for Mizar/TG.) We chose Isabelle/HOL and Mizar because they are two of the most advanced foundations of formalized mathematics in terms of library size and (semi-)automated proof support. They are also foundationally very different – higher-order logic and untyped set theory, respectively – and represent the whole spectrum of foundations. Moreover, our formalizations make the foundational assumptions of these systems explicit and thus contribute to their documentations and systematic comparison.



We have formalized translations from Isabelle/HOL and Mizar/TG into ZFC as indicated on the right. These translations can be seen as giving two foundations used in formalized mathematics a semantics in terms of the foundation dominant in traditional mathematics. Actually, the translation from Mizar/TG to ZFC^+ is only partial because the former is stronger than the latter, but this is no serious concern as we discussed in Sect. 6.3. We did not give the inverse translation from ZFC to Mizar/TG, but that would be straightforward. However, a corresponding translation from ZFC to Isabelle/HOL remains a challenge. (Translations such as the one in (Aczel 1998) would not be inverse to ours.)

Future work will focus on two research directions.

Firstly, we will formalize more foundations and translations. This is an on-going effort

in the LATIN project (Kohlhase, Mossakowski & Rabe 2009), which will provide a large library of statically verified foundation translations and for which this work provides the theoretical bases and seed library. Examples of further systems are Coq (Coquand & Huet 1988) or PVS (Owre et al. 1992).

Secondly, a major drawback of statically verified translations is that the extracted translation functions cannot be directly applied to the libraries of the foundations: First those libraries must be represented in the foundational framework. This is a conceptually trivial but practically long-term research effort that is still under way.

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